

## **Achievements and limits of strategic communication for nation-building: The case of Spain's Catalan region (1979-2017)**

Logros y limitaciones en el uso de la comunicación estratégica en procesos de construcción nacional: El caso de Cataluña (1979-2017)

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### **Abstract**

This paper explores the use of strategic communication for nation building purposes in Catalonia after the approval of the Second Statute of Autonomy in 1979. During this period, the *Generalitat de Catalunya*, Catalonia's self-government political organization, has used the high degree of autonomy in a number of areas involving culture, communications or education, among others, to enhance a Catalan identity opposed to the Spanish identity. Soft power approaches – mainly the promotion of Catalan language, culture, sports and symbols – and the implementation of linguistic laws have resulted in a positive climate of opinion concerning an inclusive Catalan identity in a region where a high percentage of the population has roots in other parts of Spain. After all these years, the outcome has been positive for Catalan nationalism: Identification with Spain has decreased while dual Catalan-Spanish and Catalan-only identification has grown; almost half of the Catalan population is pro-independence while 40 years ago was less than 20 percent. Nonetheless, the language variable still seems to be contention wall despite communication management efforts. There is still a large majority of Catalans, mostly from the Spanish-language community, that are opposed to the nation building, nowadays pro-independence, process.

**Key words:** Strategic communication, public relations, propaganda, Spain, Catalonia

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## Resumen

Este artículo explora el uso de la comunicación estratégica en el proceso de construcción nacional catalana después de la aprobación del Segundo Estatuto de Autonomía en 1979. Durante este periodo, *la Generalitat de Catalunya*, la organización política que gestiona el autogobierno de Cataluña, ha utilizado numerosas áreas de gobierno, como la cultura, la educación o la comunicación, para promover una identidad catalana opuesta a la identidad española. El uso de estrategias de *poder blando* – principalmente la promoción del catalán como lengua vehicular en la esfera pública, la cultura, el deporte o los símbolos – y la implementación de leyes lingüísticas han generado un clima de opinión positivo en lo que respecta a la creación de una identidad catalana inclusiva en una región en la que un alto porcentaje de la población tiene sus raíces en otras partes de España. El balance ha sido positivo para el nacionalismo catalán: La sola identificación con España ha decrecido mientras que la identificación dual Cataluña-España o solo Cataluña se ha incrementado; casi la mitad de la población catalana quiere la independencia mientras que 40 años atrás era menos del 20 por ciento. Sin embargo, la variable lingüística sigue actuando como muro de contención del nacionalismo a pesar del uso de la comunicación estratégica. Una mayoría de catalanes, cuya lengua nativa es el español, se opone al proceso de construcción nacional.

**Palabras clave:** Comunicación estratégica, relaciones públicas, propaganda, construcción nacional, comunidades imaginadas, España, Cataluña

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## 1. INTRODUCCION

In the last three decades, successive Catalan governments, equipped with a high degree of autonomy, have made intensive use of strategic communication to enhance a Catalan identity with the objective of facilitating political change. However, the communicative nature of the Catalan nation-building process has generally received little attention in the academic literature (García, 2013).

There are a number of articles that have focused on the role of sports in the projection of Catalan identity (Xifra, 2009a, 2009b; García, 2012a), the use of street protests in the independence process (García, 2016), and the impact on public opinion of the implementation of Catalan-only linguistic policies (Martínez-Herrera, 2002).

There are no holistic, descriptive analyses of how the use of strategic communication by the Catalan government has affected the national sentiment of Catalans. This paper argues that the use of strategic communication by the Catalan government has been successful in fostering a stronger Catalan identity in contemporary Spain. Yet the enhancement of Catalan identity has not translated into a pro-independence sentiment or political change because, as opinion surveys demonstrate, it excludes large segments of the population, namely those for whom Spanish is a first (though not necessarily only) language.

Several factors differentiate the case of Catalonia and the nation-building processes of new emerging democracies. First, Catalonia is not a state and therefore lacks national unity. Second, the strategic communication efforts of the regional government must compete with the communication apparatus of the nation state which strives to maintain and sometimes portray a different collective national identity (Morris, 2008).

A third factor is that in most of these “imagined communities” (Anderson, 1991) there is a non-nationalist side that is as strong as the nationalist (Fusi, 2006). This reality forces regional governments to use persistently one-way strategic communication efforts, emphasizing the identification features of that community in opposition to the legal

nation, as happens in the Catalan case with Spain. The lack of legitimacy nation-building political forces give to any public opposed to their objectives generally does not allow two-way communication models in which dissident voices have a presence in the public square.

## **2. LITERATURE REVIEW**

Holtzhausen and Zerfass (2013) recently defined strategic communication as “the practice of deliberate and purposive communication that a communication agent enacts in the public sphere on behalf of a communicative entity to reach set goals” (p. 74). These communicative entities have a multidisciplinary vision of communication and tend to integrate public relations, public diplomacy and other communication functions into their strategic communication efforts (van Dyke & Verčič, 2009).

The modern practice of public relations is described broadly as the strategic management of communication and relationships between organizations and publics (Sriramesh & Verčič, 2009). Scholars include public diplomacy as a specific part of the public relations concept with numerous synergies across the field of strategic communication (Signitzer & Wamser, 2006).

Taylor and Kent (2006) have emphasized the importance of strategic communication efforts to enhance national identity, and nurture nation-building. Benier (1999) and Kymlicka (2001) acknowledge that persuasive communication models by state-controlled broadcast media have represented the primary tools in most nation-building programs. In the case of nation-building processes for new democracies and developing countries, Van Leuven (1996) and Taylor and Kent (2006) argue there is a first nation-building phase where the relationship between government, media, and citizens is one-way. With economic growth, the government incorporates other public voices, which is when dialogic public relations can become reality.

Nevertheless, this perspective only explains nation-building processes for new democracies and developing countries (Taylor, 2000a, 2000b). It does not take into account the situation of regions like Catalonia, ruled by local politicians trying to build political nations

within the framework of a hosting nation-state. The fact that the Spanish government also has its own communication apparatus and that a significant portion of the population shares a Catalan-Spanish identity makes Catalan nationalist politicians less open to encouraging dissident voices in the public sphere.

The Catalan case combines traditional mass media propaganda, and the use of sports, tourism, gastronomy, and cultural events for public diplomacy purposes. Indeed, there are a number of examples in the literature on public diplomacy efforts, particularly based in the use of sports, to project Catalonia internationally (Xifra, 2009a, 2009b). L'Etang (2006) has noted the role of sports and tourism in building a national identity. Likewise, these methods also reinforce the national identity internally around a collective sentiment of achievement and pride.

### **2.1 Soft power and nation building**

The Catalan case constitutes a good example of how to apply *soft power* to nation building.

The political concept of soft power can be explained as the way a country – or, by the same token, a region – “may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries – admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness – want to follow it” (Nye, 2004, p. 5).

Thanks to the soft power approach, the new institutions of the Catalan regional government have succeeded in making the idea of being Catalan an attractive one among a majority of Catalans. The intensive use of public media, an example of soft power (Nye, 2004), is partly responsible for this success.

There has not been, however, an absence of hard power methods in the Catalan case. Indeed, the implementation of laws to foster the use of Catalan in education has constituted an axis of regional politics. Research reveals that relative exposure to Catalan versus Spanish marks the most explanatory variable in accounting for informant-to-informant deviation in measures of political ideology ( $p < .0000$ ,  $R^2 = .79$ ,  $F = 69.17$ ) (Vann,

1999).

### 3. METHOD

This paper uses Catalonia as a case study of how the governments of regions or “stateless nations” work to become nations for their own citizens. The author uses a qualitative historical-critical method to investigate the connection between the strategic communication management of a regional government in a nation-building process and the attitudes of the population over the course of four decades. The approach is holistic and considers each communication function, including those theoretically intended for foreign publics such as public diplomacy. These data has been collected using press sources (mainly the two main Spain’s newspaper, *El País* and *El Mundo* and the main regional Catalan newspaper, *La Vanguardia*) as well as official statistics, history and political science scholarship. This method has been applied in recent times to analyse the nation building strategic communication efforts of other regions such as the Basque Country (García, 2012b).

The article evaluates the correlation between these strategic communication efforts and the attitudinal changes of the Catalan population toward two of the paramount elements that define any nation-building process: identity, and the political status quo (Keating, 2001). Additionally, the paper traces the correlation between those two factors and forming part of the Spanish or Catalan linguistic community in order to establish some of the most common barriers to the use of strategic communication in nation-building processes. The author has made use of the two leading sociological statistical surveys implemented in Catalonia – that of the CIS (Center for Sociological Research), Spain’s government-backed national public opinion institute, and the Centre d’Estudis d’Opinió (Center of Opinion Studies), an organ of the Catalan autonomous government dedicated to implementing polls and surveys analyzing the political and social evolution of Catalan society. This historical-critical method can provide a valid interpretation optimal for reproduction in the cases of other regions with a high degree of autonomy that have spent long periods in a nation-building process.

The data analysis does, however, have its limitations. It does not establish an empirical alignment between strategic communication efforts and changes in perceptions, although it can signal trends.

#### **4. ANALYSIS**

##### **4.1. Public media campaigns**

The Catalan government has used its extensive public media system to build narratives and manufacture stories that suggest Catalonia is a *de facto* nation. Key factors include programming attractive television and radio programs, controlling the local printed press via indirect subsidies, and pushing intensive mass media campaigns.

The communicative power of the Catalan government is relevant. It is not only the owner of the main media conglomerate that operates in Catalonia, Corporació Catalana de Mitjans Audiovisuals (CCMA) [Catalan Corporation of Audiovisual Media]), a public broadcast service in Catalan with six television channels, four radio stations including the audience leader Catalunya Radio, and the Agencie Catalana de Notícies (Catalan News Agency), among other companies. Its 2,285 employees (e-notícies, 2016) are equivalent to roughly 40 percent of the entire 4,517-employee radio and television workforce in Catalonia (Clúster Audiovisual de Catalunya, 2016).

The regional government's media power also enables it to concede subsidies to the regional newspapers published in Catalan (Blasco, 2008). Since 2008 the Catalan Government gave subsidies worth 14 million euros per year to Catalan newspapers. One newspaper published exclusively in Catalan, *El Punt-Avui*, is even co-owned by the regional government (Rubio, 2014).

The added audience of the conglomerate of public channels represents approximately 16.6 percent of the total audience (Consell de l'Audiovisual de Catalunya, 2016). This data acquires more relevance if we take into consideration that the flagship of this group, TV3, has the highest share (12 percent) in the region and their newscasts have the highest share

(31 percent), more than twice the market share of Spain's main national public channel (Consell de l'Audiovisual de Catalunya, 2016).

Two Catalan radio stations lead the radio broadcast system audience rankings, RAC 1 and Catalunya Ràdio. Together they account for an audience of 1.3 million listeners, equivalent to two-thirds of the entire audience in Catalonia. The public station Catalunya Ràdio is directly promoted by the Catalan government while RAC 1, although private, receives 150,000 euros in annual subsidies as part of the government's mission to promote the Catalan language (Roger, 2013). In terms of opinion creation, radio in Spain is more relevant than in other countries because it is a much more opinionated media platform than television and dedicates considerably more space to political information.

Since 1979, two main features of the Catalan press landscape have been clear: its strong dependence on public funds and its high level of politicization (González, 1995). In 2016, within a context of budget cuts, the Catalan government gave 7.5 million euros to the Catalan press via subsidies (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2016a). Furthermore, the Catalan government, spent in 2015 more than 29 million euros to buy space in Catalan media to publicize a number of institutional campaigns (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2016b).

In sum, thanks to the climate of opinion created by the Catalan public media apparatus, even the most moderate part of the Catalan electorate, many not born in Catalonia, has adopted the Catalan nationalist thesis about the need for more self-government for Catalonia (Centre d'Estudis d'Opinió, 2016). The media strategy has proved effective.

#### **4.2 Display of nation state-like institutional power**

Since 1979, the Catalan government has pursued a localized replication of the powers and symbols of Spain's government. Catalonia has its own police force, sends government representatives to visit foreign countries, and possesses ornamental signs such as a flag, a national anthem, and so on (Moreno, 2001).



Catalan institutions have proved not only an effective way to visualize Catalan identity but also a way to occupy the public sphere. Indeed, most cultural life in Catalonia depends on support from the Catalan government (McRoberts, 2001). The main Catalan civic, sport and cultural organizations coordinate events, develop surveys and publish documents that all promote Catalan culture. Their actions have persuaded many Catalans that not only does the regional government support the “nation-building” process but Catalan society as a whole.

A representation of this is the Catalan government’s creation of a slew of literary awards to incentivize the creation of cultural products in the Catalan language. Indeed, there are more than 1,000 literary prizes in Catalonia (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2015). The most important cultural entity in the region is Òmnium Cultural, a private organization that receives 1.4 million euros annually from the Catalan government (La Vanguardia, 2012).

The Catalan government has also tried to capitalize on the international reputation of leading Catalan artists to project the image of Catalonia and Barcelona as a creative city. The celebration of special events such as the "Gaudí year" in 2002 and "The Dalí year" in 2004 has had considerable international resonance.

The prioritization of culture in Catalan, however, does bring some problems and contradictions. One such example was when the Catalan Department of Culture promoted a presentation of Catalan-only authors at the German Book Fair in 2009, questionably excluding some of the most prominent Catalan authors whose work happens to be produced in Spanish (El País, 2007).

### **4.3 Street protests**

The organization of street protests to commemorate the Diada, the national day of Catalonia on September 11, has played a huge role in the development of the Catalan pro-independence movement. Although this annual event is usually organized by civic associations like Òmnium Cultural, it has also counted on ample support from the Catalan government in logistics, media support and finances. Massive, organized street protests,

particularly the 2012, 2013 and 2014 Diada demonstrations, were successfully used as a strategic communication tool to establish the independence of Catalonia on the political agenda of Catalan citizens and politicians as well as the rest of the world (García, 2016).

#### **4.4 Public diplomacy**

Other soft power elements used to project Catalan identity around the world are sports, cultural events and the display of a network of delegations, offices and cultural centers around the world.

##### **4.4.1. Barcelona Football Club (BFC)**

BFC is the leading agenda-setter in the region (Xifra, 2009b). Indeed, 21.8 percent of all media coverage in Catalonia has to do with BFC, more than the Catalan government's 8.4 percent (Bañeres, 2000).

The exclusive use of Catalan flags during national and international matches, and the use of giant banners with slogans such as "Catalonia is not Spain," (Ara, 2013) not only energize supporters but also communicate to the rest of the world the existence of an identity conflict with Spain. BFC is constantly used as a national symbol. In 2010, BFC board members agreed to offer the club's facilities for use to help coordinate a referendum for Catalan independence from Spain (La Vanguardia, 2010).

The identification between Catalonia and BFC is intentional. The Catalan government launched a 2017 campaign with the slogan "If you feel FC Barcelona, you feel Catalonia" to attract foreign tourism.

##### **4.4.2. Organization of international sporting events**

The organization of international events has always been seen as an opportunity for Catalan nationalists to project Catalan identity as well as to inform the rest of the world about the existence of a conflict between Catalonia and Spain. During the opening ceremony of the Barcelona Olympics in 1992, some organized groups carried *senyeres* (Catalan flags) and displayed slogans on t-shirts and banners such as "freedom for

Catalonia” and “Catalonia is not Spain” in the same way they still do during BFC matches (Hargreaves, 2000).

The Catalan government has taken pains to promote Catalan sports, in official competitions usually reserved for nation states, through recognition of Catalan federations of sports such as korfbal, pitch and putt, futsal, rugby and Australian football.

#### 4.4.3. Promotion of Catalan “national” teams

In the search for an international sports presence, the regional government has also supported non-governmental actors such as the Pro-Catalan National Teams Platform (Plataforma Pro Seleccions Esportives Catalanes) to promote campaigns such as “one nation, one team,” encouraging Catalans to publicly demonstrate their support for national teams (Roger, 2010).

#### 4.4.4. Paradiplomacy efforts

With the intention of giving Catalonia a political and cultural presence in other countries, between 2011 and 2014 the Generalitat de Catalunya had 25 *embassies*, commercial and tourist offices, and institutes, such as the Ramon Llull institute for the promotion of Catalan culture, in foreign countries (Hernández, 2016). The *embassies*, located in global cities such as Paris, London, Brussels, Washington and New York, cannot be considered embassies proper because only legal states can have ambassadors. However, these delegations, as they are also known, do assume the same functions of political representation.

### **4.5 Implementation of linguistic policies: Soft power or hard power?**

The implementation of laws, such as the Catalan linguistic policies, intended to alter social reality can be considered a use of hard power. There is some evidence that fostering vernacular languages has contributed to a sense of disaffection among political communities across Spain (Martínez-Herrera, 2002). The Catalan parliament's approvals of the Law of Linguistic Normalization in 1983 and the Law of Linguistic Policy in 1998 were

controversial. Their objectives were to promote the use of Catalan in the public sphere. Although the Statute of Autonomy considers Castilian Spanish and Catalan both languages of Catalonia, the two aforementioned laws prioritized the use of Catalan (McRoberts, 2001).

Nevertheless, considering that Spanish is the native language of a majority of Catalans (Idescat, 2008), the reaction against the imposition of Catalan as the sole language, for example in education, has not been as strong as might be expected. The reason, arguably, is that for a majority of Castilian Spanish speakers accustomed to seeing the greater social and economic status of Catalan speakers, Catalan-only education represents a vehicle for social progress.

Hence, it is fair to argue that these laws are impositions. The acceptance of these laws can be considered an example of what Nye (2011) calls the third face of relational power whereby "A helps to create and shape B's basic beliefs, perceptions, and preferences. B is unlikely to be aware of this or to realize the effect of A's power" (p. 28). In other words, the regional government would have been effective in shaping Spanish-speaking Catalan citizens' language preferences by positioning Catalan as an engine for social progress, thereby avoiding its perception as an imposition.

In sum, the capillary process derived from soft power methods offers pros and cons. The use of mass media has involved a high level of manipulation in order to create a virtual nation, ignoring the existence of a pluralistic Catalan society with a diversity of origins and thoughts. However, simultaneously, the Catalonia brand (and, very particularly, the Barcelona brand) would not have been possible without the good governance required for the quality branding of places.

## **5. DISCUSSION**

The comparison between the historical account and empirical polls provides insight into the effectiveness of the Catalan government's strategic management of communication for purposes of nation-building.

In 1984, the first year when this type of survey started to be periodically implemented, 67 percent of the Catalan population felt only Spanish or as Spanish as Catalan: 22 percent identified themselves as Spanish only or more Spanish than Catalan, and 45 percent felt equally Spanish and Catalan (CIS, 2015). In 2017, only 49.3 percent felt only Spanish or as Spanish as Catalan, while the other 50 percent felt more Catalan than Spanish (22.6 percent) or only Catalan (23.3 percent) (CEO, 2017).

**Table 1. Evolution of Catalan National Subjective Identity**

	1984	1988	1992	1995	2003	2006	2010	2012	2017
Only Spanish	11	12	13	11.2	9.8	6.6	9.9	5.8	7.6
More Spanish than Catalan	11	10	11	5.6	6.7	5.4	6.7	5	5
As Spanish as Catalan	45	35	36	41.2	43.2	40.6	43.9	37.6	36.7
More Catalan than Spanish	22	28	21	24.7	24.7	27.8	22.5	24.8	22.6
Only Catalan	8	14	17	15.8	13.9	17.5	14.5	24.4	23.3
Don't know / No answer	3	1	2	1.4	1.8	2.1	2.5	2.3	4.8
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Sources: CIS and CEO (2017).

Likewise, as Table 2 illustrates, although a majority of Catalans still want their region to be a part of Spain, pro-independence sentiment has grown exponentially and seems to have stabilized, after a decline from its peak in 2013 and despite the end of the economic crisis, at around 40 percent.

**Table 2. Political status of Catalonia**

	2005	2007	2009	2011	2013	2016
Independent Nation State	12.9	17.3	21.6	28.2	48.5	41.6
Federal State	35.8	33.8	29.9	30.3	21.3	20.9
Autonomous Community	37.6	37.8	36.9	30.4	18.6	26.5
Region	5.6	5.1	5.9	5.7	5.4	4.0
Don't know / No answer	8.1	6	5.1	5.4	6.2	5.6
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: CEO.

The connection between the surveys on the national subjective identity of Catalans and political status evolution is undeniable. More Catalan identity means more desire for self-government, if not a directly pro-independence sentiment. Therefore, it can be argued that the strategic communication efforts by the Catalan government have been effective in strengthening a Catalan identity that pushes for political change.

Still, we do not know to what extent this merit should be attributed to variables such as education policies or even mere demographics if, as Vann (1999) and Antón Merino (2015) suggest, the relative exposure to Catalan or Spanish is the major explanatory variable of political ideology.

For example, 80 percent of pro-independence Catalans consider Catalan their main language while about 75 percent of Catalans against independence consider Castilian their primary language (CEO, 2017). Likewise, Catalans who chose Spanish Castilian as their mother language have a dual identity, they feel as Spanish as Catalan (55 percent), while Catalans whose mother language is Catalan have a much higher exclusively Catalan sentiment (CIS, 2012) (see Table 3). Those Catalans who consider Catalan their mother tongue tend, on average, to be in favor of more autonomy or independence for Catalonia (see Table 4). It would seem that the strategic communication efforts, while having some

impact on Castilian-speaking Catalans, have had more impact on the primarily Catalan-speaking population.

**Table 3. Pre-electoral CIS: National subjective identity and mother language**

	Castilian	Catalan	Both
Only Spanish	11	0	1
More Spanish than Catalan	9	0	1
As Spanish as Catalan	55	16	46
More Catalan than Spanish	18	34	31
Only Catalan	7	50	21
TOTAL	100	100	100

Source: CIS.

**Table 4. Pre-electoral CIS: Preferences in the political organization and mother language**

	Castilian	Catalan	Both
A Centralized State	15	3	1
A State in which autonomous communities have less autonomy	5	1	3
As the current State	24	5	14
A State in which Autonomous Communities have more autonomy	30	21	30
A State in which independence is possible	22	62	40

Source: CIS.

If we take into account the fact that Castilian Spanish is the first language for 55 percent of Catalans (Idescat, 2008), the language variable seems to pose an obstacle for strategic communication in nation-building. This circumstance is particularly relevant taking into consideration that Catalonia has traditionally been a place of immigration. More than 18 percent of current Catalans were born elsewhere in Spain (Idescat, 2007). In 1970 alone, 840,000 Andalusians emigrated to Catalonia, mostly Barcelona and its suburbs (Marín, 2010). At least until demographics change, the language variable seems at least as important, if not more, than strategic communication efforts.

## 6. CONCLUSION

Nowadays, a number of communication disciplines seem to minimize the importance of persuasion in part because of allegations of manipulation (Hallahan, Holtzhausen, van Ruler, Vercic & Sriramesh, 2007). Nevertheless, persuasion “is the essence of strategic communication” (p. 24). The Catalan nation-building process is a demonstration of the power of both persuasion and propaganda. It demonstrates that the influence of a media apparatus and the implementation of public media campaigns are effective methods for creating “a national conscience” – or at least a sentiment of identity – among the citizenship in scenarios where the legal nation's means of communication, in this case Spain's, tend to overlap with the regional ones. In the Catalan case, the advantage of the Catalan public media comes not only from its obvious local character but also its superiority in terms of human and material resources in comparison to the national public media outlets of Spain.

The Catalan experience also acknowledges how government policies can be considered an integral part of the whole communication process (Taylor & Kent, 2006). The governments of regions with a high degree of autonomy, such as Catalonia, often have the capacity to enact policies that counteract the laws of the legal nation. We find an example of this regarding the use of languages in the public sphere. For example, Spain's Constitution establishes the right of Spaniards to use Spanish in any circumstance in national territory, a fact that is *de facto* denied by the primacy given to Catalan since the enactment of local linguistic laws. Catalan nationalist politicians know no Spanish government is going to enforce the legality because, in a country where the memory of Franco is still alive, that would be perceived as an attack on the Catalan language by not just many Catalans, but also many other Spaniards and a portion of the international public aware of the Catalan issue thanks to public diplomacy efforts.

A main criticism of this heavy use of persuasion and propaganda is that it has generated alienation from the political process among a certain segment of the population, particularly the lowest social strata, since Catalan nationalism can be understood as a top-



led project (Miley, 2007; García, 2010). This fact has been evident in most elections where popular participation barely reaches 60 percent, and particularly in the last referendum to approve the new Second Statue of Autonomy in 2006, where barely 50 percent voted. In a highly pluralistic region where we find people born in Catalonia, people whose parents came from other parts of Spain and people who were born in other parts of Spain or the world, Catalan nationalism projects a very homogeneous idea of Catalan identity. Strategic management of communication in nation-building processes where identities and languages overlap should abandon maximalist objectives, and be redefined as building collective and inclusive identities that can be shared by most members of a society.

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